The abilities we deliberately left out
Most of the pitch is about what you can switch on. This post is about the floor under all of it: what an agent cannot do here, no matter what you enable.
Read moreWhat we fixed in the 1.7.0 correctness release
Version 1.7.0 closes an OAuth revocation race, stops a payment gateway credential leak, and fixes four ACF writes that were destroying content.
Read moreAI agent WordPress security risks
Five real risks of an AI agent on WordPress, deletion, data leakage, injected content, and credential exposure, mapped to the control that limits each one.
Read moreWordPress AI prompt injection, contained
A hidden instruction in a comment can fool an AI agent on WordPress. What indirect prompt injection is, and how governance contains it when detection can't.
Read moreLimit an AI agent to Editor, not Admin
An AI agent takes on whatever WordPress user connects it. Here is why Editor beats Administrator as that account, and how to scope the connection on purpose.
Read moreHigh-risk lock and read-only mode, explained
Two controls decide what an AI agent is even offered on your WordPress site, before any per-call permission check runs: the high-risk lock and read-only mode.
Read moreWhat we fixed: media reads reached past the uploader
In 1.4.3 an author-level user could read the entire WordPress media library, not just their own uploads. Here is the bug, the fix, and what else shipped.
Read moreWhat we fixed in the 1.3.0 security release
In 1.3.0 we turned OAuth off by default and fixed real security gaps in our own plugin, patched in the open. Here is what changed.
Read moreOff by default: how the governance model works
A walk through the governance model behind Agent Abilities for MCP, covering least privilege, off by default, capability gating, and an honest audit log.
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